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in the record of which he seeks inspection and the inspection must
be for a legitimate purpose ....
In Daily Gazette the court based
its determination that the petitioner sought to inspect the certificate
for an improper purpose upon petitioner's admitted purpose that
it sought to publish the certificate in order to dissuade other voters
from signing the certificate. The court reasoned that it is inherent
in a free society that its members be able to nominate a candidate of
their choice for political office, irrespective of who he is or what his
philosophies are, without fear of embarrassment or intimidation from
anyone, provided they do so in compliance with the law.2"
This case establishes the certificate of nomination as a valuable
method whereby citizens of West Virginia can nominate candidates
of their choice without relying exclusively on political parties. One
can expect to see this method used more frequently in the future
because of the emergence of new minority groups who wish to
express their political views. This case is significant in setting a
precedent which can be relied upon by persons seeking to employ
the certificate of nomination to nominate candidates.
Ray Allen Byrd
Danny Lee Stickler

Federal Courts-Standard of Domicile in Diversity Cases
Infant plaintiff brought an action by next friend to surcharge the
guardian of the infant's estate for mismanagement. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
dismissed the action for want of diversity jurisdiction, and plaintiff
appealed. Held, reversed and remanded. The question of the domicile of an infant plaintiff in a diversity action is determinable by
federal common law rather than by the law of either of the states
wherein the parties reside; and for purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction, infant plaintiff, who was born and raised in North
Carolina, who lived in North Carolina in custody of the father after
parent's divorce until father's death, and who thereafter lived in New
Jersey with his mother and stepfather, who were domiciled there,
24
25

Id. at 254, 43 S.E.2d at 218.

State ex rel. Daily Gazette Co. v. Bailey, 164 S.E.2d 414, 419 (W. Va.

1968).
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acquired domicile of his mother and was a citizen of New Jersey.
Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1968).
This case was brought under the authority of 28 U.S.C. section
1332 which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs,
and is between (1) citizens of different states. . . ." One of the
principle purposes of this statute is to give a citizen of one state
access to an unbiased court to protect him from parochialism if he
should be forced into litigation in another state in which he is a
stranger and of which his opponent is a citizen. For this purpose to
be accomplished, citizens must have access to federal district courts
without interference from a tangled webb of state procedural and
jurisdictional rules. This case represents the position that in infant
domicile cases, federal courts should determine diversity of citizenship by a uniform federal standard. Implicit in this approach is the
idea that federal courts can use their own rules to determine
diversity in federal cases.
Since Justice Brandeis overruled Swift v. Tyson' in the now
famous decision of Erie R. R. v. Thompkins,' federal courts have
been required to follow the law of the state of the forum as to
substantive matters when trying diversity of citizenship actions.3
Under the law of North Carolina an unemancipated infant cannot
of his own volition select, acquire, or change his domicile,4 and,
upon the death of the father, the child's domicile is that which the
father held at death.' However, the law of North Carolina also
141 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). Under the rule of Swift v. Tyson
federal courts were not bound by state court decisions in matters of general
law or commercial law. The Court said, "Undoubtedly, the decisions of the
local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the most
deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive
rules, or conclusive authority by which our own judgments are to be bound
up and governed."
2 Erie R. R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). Thus the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, "an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of
time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."
In disapproving that doctrine . . . we merely declare that in applying
the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which
in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states.
3Williams v. Green Bay & W. Ry., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Klaxton Co.
v. Sentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); O'Brien v. Willys Motors
Inc., 385 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1967). 600 California Corp. v. Harjean Co., 284
F. Supp.
843 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
4
Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 1951); Duke v. Johnton, 211
N.C. 171, 189 S.E. 504 (1937).
5
In re Hall's Guardianship, 235 N.C. 697, 71 S.E.2d 140 (1952).
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provides that a guardian by nature may change the domicile of an
unemancipated child.' It would appear, therefore, that the mother,
as the child's guardian by nature,7 could change the domicile of her
son. Thus, the result of the instant case could have been the same
had North Carolina law been applied.
An interesting question is present, however, as to the jurisdiction
of the court in the light of Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 17(b) provides that "[t]he capacity of an
individual.. .to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his
domicile. ."' But domicile is the issue in this case, and no answer is
given as to whether state or federal law should apply to that
question.
The court in ziady v. Curley saw the issue of domicile in the
diversity of citizenship case as uniquely the province of the federal
courts.' There would seem to be three possible bases for this determination. The court may have believed that the issue was prerequisite
to deciding substantive matters and therefore was by nature procedural."0 Viewing domicile as a procedural matter makes a critical
difference, for while federal courts in diversity cases are bound to
follow the substantive law of the state in which they sit," they are not
bound by procedural law of such state.' 2 There is also authority
that federal courts are not bound by the state court's characterization
of a matter as substantive or procedural in determining whether
state law is binding in diversity cases. 3
It is also possible that the court may have seen the issue as
neither substantive nor procedural. It is established that when
federal procedure varies from state procedure, federal courts
61d.
7 "A guardian by nature is the father, and on his death, the mother of a
child ..
" BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 834 (4th ed. 1951).
89 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873, 874 (4th Cir. 1968). "We have no
doubt that it is to the federal common law to which we should look. The
question of domicile can arise in regard to the diversity clause of Article
III, § 2 of the Federal Constitution and under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, only in
federal court."
10 Id.
11 Erie

R. R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Dunn v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 271 F. Supp. 662, 664 (Del. 1967).
"Under the 'substance/procedure' dichotomy of Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938) . . . a federal court sitting in a diversity case is only bound
to follow
the substantive law of the state in which it sits."
' 3 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 274 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D. Del. 1967).
"This court, of course, is not necessarily bound by the State Court's characterization of a matter as substantive or procedural in determining whether
state law is binding upon it under the Erie doctrine."
12
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exercising diversity jurisdiction are not bound by the characterization
of legal rules as substantive or procedural in other contexts, but
by the principle that the outcome of the case should be substantially
the same as it would have been had the case been tried in a state
court. 4 This principle has been applied to require federal courts
to follow state law as to presumptions,'" burdens of proof, 6 and
the probative force of evidence. 7 Apparently, however, it has not
been used to settle jurisdictional questions.
It seems likely, however, that the court felt that there was simply
no doubt that federal common law should be used to determine the
domicile of the parties in diversity cases. Indeed this seems to be the
logical conclusion from a study of the cases. Although it would
appear that such a principle has never been precisely stated, it has
been said that state law cannot limit or otherwise affect the jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by the Constitution and laws of
the United States. 8 Also, it has been held that federal district courts
are bound only by federal laws in jurisdictional matters, 9 and
the seventh circuit has stated that when an action is brought in a
federal district court, questions relating to jurisdiction are governed
by federal law.2" Thus, the court could easily have assumed it to
be "obvious" that federal common law would apply, notwithstanding,
the absence of cases precisely in point.
Whatever route the court chose to take, once it reached the point
of deciding that domicile was to be determined by federal common
law, 2' it then had to decide what that federal common law was to be.
The court had to decide whether any federal common law existed
as to domicile in diversity cases, and if not, where to look for
authority to establish the federal common law of domicile in diversity.
The court could find no federal cases in point other than
Lamar v. Micou,22 the only case relied upon by the district court,
14 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), rehearing denied,
326 U.S. 806 (1945).
15 Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
16 Id.
7

1 Sheptur v. Proctor and Gamble Distributing Co., 261 F.2d 221 (6th
Cir. 1958).
18 Penn. General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294
U.S. 189 (1935).
19 Berianti Const. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).2 0
229 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1956).

Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Falkingham,
Federal common law does not exist according to Justice Cardozo's
opinion
22 in Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
21

Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452 (1884).
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and it found that case to be distinguishable.23 The Lamar case
held that while a widow had the power to change the domicile of
her children, she lost that power if she remarried. 4 The court
observed that the primary consideration in Lamar v. Micou was
the necessity of adopting a rule which would provide a fixed and
definite standard by which the investment conduct of the guardian
could be measured and which would prevent those having control
over the infant's person from themselves choosing the applicable
law by changing the infant's state of residence.2 5 However, the
court in ziady reasoned these considerations, are not relevant in
defining domicile for the purpose of determining whether diversity
jurisdiction exists.26
Once the court distinguished Lamar v. Micou,27 it relied on the
Restatement of the Law of Conflicts and relevant comments to
support its finding as to the federal common law of domicile.28 The
Restatement provides that "if the father dies and no guardian of
his minor child's person is appointed, the child has the same
domicile as that of the mother"29 and if the mother remarries, the
child's domicile follows that of the mother unless she abandons the
child.3
While there are, as the court pointed out,"1 no federal cases in
point other than Lamar v. Micou3 2 there does exist some degree
of authority for the court's decision arising out of various state court
holdings. A New York case held that on the death of the father, the
mother's domicile determined that of the child, notwithstanding a3
divorce decree which awarded custody of the child to the father.
Also, an Iowa case held that the courts of Iowa (the father's
23 "We have serious doubt, however, of the continued vitality of the
Lamar case, and we conclude that, in any event, it is distinguishable. In the
discussion of domicile, the Lamar case can only be understood as a then
expression of the basic concept of feudal law that a married woman could
have no existence apart from her husband." Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873,
876 24
(4th Cir. 1968).
Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452 (1884).
25
Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873, 876 (4th Cir. 1968).
26

1d.

27

28

Id., see note 14 supra.
1d.

29 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 38 (1934).
30
1d.
31 Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873, 874 (4th Cir. 1968). "[M/e have not
been referred to, nor have we found, any case which purports to establish
the applicable federal common law."
32 Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452 (1884).
33
1n re Thorne's Guardianship, 212 App, Div. 654, 209 N.Y.S. 280
(1925).
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domicile) were without jurisdiction to grant guardianship over the
person of an infant who survived the death of his father in whose
custody he had been given by a decree of divorce. Here it appeared
that the infant's mother was at the time a resident of Texas, and
the domicile of the infant became, on the death of his father,
identified with the domicile of his mother.3 4 In neither of these
cases was there a remarriage of the widow, as in the ziady case.
They are, therefore, seemingly reconcilable with the Lamar decision.
One Texas case, however, involved the problem of such a remarriage.35 The Texas Supreme Court decided that a widow does not
lose the power to change the domicile of her children simply by
remarrying. 6 That case is not directly in point with the present
case because there was no divorce involved, but it is difficult to
see how that would alter the result, at least as it affects the child's
domicile.
It may be questioned whether the court in ziady was forced
to make the sweeping declaration that in determining diversity of
citizenship the issue of domicile is a matter for federal common
law. Nevertheless it would seemingly be desirable to have one
rule, or one set of rules, to determine the jurisdiction of all federal
courts in such cases. What form these might take is of course
conjectural, and knowledge of this must await the cases which
will create such rules.
William A Tantlinger
James M. Brown
Landlord and Tenant-Constitutional LawRetaliatory Evictions
In March 1965, Mrs. Edwards rented housing property from
Nathan Habib on a monthly basis. Shortly thereafter, she complained to the Department of Licenses and Inspections of certain
violations of the sanitary code which her landlord had failed to
alleviate. During the subsequent inspection, forty violations were discovered, and Habib was ordered to correct them. Habib then gave
Mrs. Edwards the necessary 30-day statutory notice to vacate and
when she refused, he instituted action and obtained a default
judgment for possession of the premises. The tenant moved to re34In re Guardianship of Skinner,
5
3 Wheeler v. Hollis, 19 Tex. 522

230 Iowa 1016, 300 N.W. 1 (1941).
(1857).

361d.
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